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ABSTRACT 
 
The possibilities for good governance depends on institutional structures and the 
economic resources available for ensuring governance.  In some cases centralised 
governance structures are inefficient.  In other cases, decentralised structures turn out 
to be inadequate.  In India decentralisation of power to village level has not improved 
the efficiency of rural development.  Decentralisation of power, it is said, by facilitating 
the empowerment of people in local communities can contribute to more sustainable 
development.  On the other hand, in India, the delegation of power to the states in some 
cases has resulted in the destruction of the environment.  Thus centralised and 
decentralised governance structure have both merits and demerits.  Preservation of the 
environment which is essential for sustainable development can not be achieved unless 
the pressure on forest and natural resources is reduced.  This cannot happen in the 
absence of appropriate property rights of local communities and of rural women.  In 
West Bengal as well as in the central Himalayan region in India it has been found that 
the disappearance of community control and restrictions on the user rights of villagers 
reduced the incentive and ability of villagers to use forest sustainability. 
 
On the other hand, in Russia, pristine forests are being degraded because of lack 
of resources of the weak central government.  Good governance also depends on 
appropriate institutions.  Corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, inefficient and corrupt law 
enforcement agencies undermine the capacity of institutions to facilitate good 
governance for sustainable development.  Corruption and rent seeking activities can 
grow even in an economy which has tried to apply outward oriented economic policies if 
an appropriate institutional environment does not exist.  A state which assumes 
predatory or semi-predatory status can systematically incapacitate all institutions for 
good governance and effective implementation of policies. 
 
Thus formulation of policies cannot ensure effective implementation in the 
absence of good governance which in turn can not be achieved in the absence of 
appropriate institutions.  Hence, sustainable development requires good policies and 
effective provision of institutions conducive to good governance. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The possibilities for good governance depends on institutional structures and the 
economic resources available for ensuring governance.  In some cases centralised 
governance structures are inefficient.  In other cases decentralised structures turn out to 
be inadequate.  In a federal state with a multi-party democracy such as India, the 
capacity of the federal governance structure to influence the states' governance 
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apparatus is limited when the state administrations are run by political parties not in 
power at the federal level and since the production and delivery of certain goods and 
services are controlled by state administrations, conflict is likely to occur when the 
centre wants to impose its decision on the states.  This conflict contributes to 
ineffectiveness.  But the inefficiency may also result from the formulation and application 
of policies by the central government which is out of touch with the needs of local people 
and has little knowledge of local environment. 
There are numerous cases where the programmes and projects formulated at the 
top and implemented for people at the bottom did not achieve the desired results. 
Roy and Tisdell (1992, 1995) in examining the impact of technological change on 
the rural sector in India, argued that serious deficiencies existed in implementing 
policies and administering development programmes. 
An evaluation of the "food for work" scheme revealed that women accounted for 
only twenty percent of the beneficiaries (Duvvury 1989).  A study of the impact of the 
Integrated Rural Development Projects (IRDP) by Rath (1985) found that the 
beneficiaries were mis-classified and that only three percent of the rural poor were able 
to cross the poverty line.  Ben Crow (1992) observes that what the IRDP, first envisaged 
as a comprehensive strategy for growth with social justice, came to be implemented as 
the promotion of individual household enterprise because it did not threaten the 
dominant rural power structure.  Thus one can say that the interests that the Indian state 
represent include those of the dominant rural class.  However in Ben Crow's argument 
the implication is that IRDP at least served the interest of the dominant ruling class but 
sometimes, the interest of the state may not include the interest of any dominant class.  
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In any case, Van Arkadie (1990) argues that the power relations within which states and 
institutions operate cause them to pursue objectives inconsistent with development. 
Decentralised governance structure reduces the need for co-ordination as the 
centralised structure transfers to lower levels of government those functions which it 
cannot manage effectively.  Chambers (1988) has argued that large centralised and 
hierarchical organisations such as governments tend to simplify, centralise and 
standardise.  These may be appropriate ways for organising some kinds of activities, 
but not others. 
Decentralisation conventionally has taken three forms - (i) "deconcentration" 
referring to transferring resources and decision making from headquarters to other 
branches of central government; (ii) "devolution" referring to devolution of resources and 
power to autonomous units of government such as municipalities and local governments 
and (iii) "delegation" meaning delegation of resources and power to organisations 
outside the regular bureaucratic structures such as public corporations, development 
agencies or NGO's (World Bank 1983). 
"Devolution" and "delegation" if carried out properly, can make development 
programmes effective.  However, decentralisation in developing countries has mostly 
taken the form of deconcentration.  In India, one major act of "devolution" was the 
creation of Panchayati Raj and the transfer of resources and power to these village 
governments.  However, this does not mean that decentralisation has improved the 
efficiency of the administration of rural development.  In fact, the benefits of such 
decentralisation have been mostly enjoyed by the dominant power groups of the 
dominant political party.  Moreover local governments suffer from a shortage of 
technical and administrative skills.  Also, genuine decentralisation of resources and 
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power can not take place in India unless the entire structure of development planning 
changes.  In decentralised power structure, plans are formulated by the rural people at 
the grass root level and not imposed from above. 
Although this form of planning was envisaged by Gandhi to be suitable for India 
(Roy and Tisdell 1992, 1995; Schumacher 1962), it could not have been implemented 
on a national scale in India because of its inherent limitations. 
Decentralisation of power can facilitate empowerment of people.  Some writers 
suggest that local communities should be empowered and that this is likely to result in 
more sustainable development.  Local communities are said to be more knowledgeable 
about the results of local environmental change.  The features of normal bureaucracy 
which include centralisation of authority, especially financial control and standardisation 
of rules, recommendations and actions may not facilitate the empowerment of people.  
Hence, it is felt that the participation of beneficiaries in the formulation, implementation 
and maintenance of programmes is necessary.  The justification of the local 
community's participation is based on the arguments that (i) local people organise best 
around the problems they consider most important such as in assessing needs and 
finding solutions; (ii) local people make rational economic decisions in the context of 
their own environment and circumstances providing appropriately for the risks 
associated with the change; and that (iii) local participation also ensures voluntary 
commitment of resources and local control over the quality and distribution of benefits 
(Yugandhar and Raju 1992). 
On the one hand, centralisation of power in some cases has resulted in 
destruction of environment, loss of forests etc. as reported for Nepal by Mishra (1982) 
but on the other, decentralisation has sometimes hastened deforestation and 
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biodiversity loss as in Indian States like Mizoram.  Therefore, it would seem that there 
are advantages and disadvantages of both centralised and decentralised governance 
structures. 
 
Property Rights and Environment 
Preservation of the environment, which is the most essential prerequisite to 
sustainable development, cannot be achieved unless the pressure on forests and other 
natural resources resulting from their excessive use is eased.  But the pressure is 
unlikely to be eased in the absence of appropriate property rights of local communities.  
Absence of appropriate property rights is one of the reasons why local communities do 
not take care of the environment.  Appropriate property rights consist of user rights to 
forests and commons and effective ownership rights to cultivable land.  Since the vast 
majority of the population in Third World countries live in rural areas and since rural 
women's reliance on renewable resources for providing sustenance to their families is 
far greater than men's, measures to ensure that rural women enjoy such rights assume 
crucial importance for good governance.  Effective ownership rights to cultivable land by 
making women more economically independent significantly reduces their need to rely 
on forests and natural resources and appropriate user rights to forests provide them the 
incentive to preserve the renewable resources and not to destroy them. 
A number of studies (Dasgupta and Maity 1986; Agarwal 1989; Duvvury 1989; 
Kandiyoti 1992; Roy and Tisdell 1993a,b; Agarwal 1994) have commented on the lack 
of and the need for women's effective ownership rights to land in India.  In West Bengal 
when the control of forests was taken over by the Forest Department, local people were 
deprived of the user rights to forests.  Due to the lack of economic incentive for 
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conservation, tribals specially disadvantaged by changed ownership and user rights and 
facing possible loss of income from the forests and other villagers have no incentive to 
protect the renewable resources.  Hence, they attempt to exploit the forests before the 
Forest Department does.  The nature of ownership and user rights for tribals and non-
tribal villagers in West Bengal and in other states of Eastern India is complex and seems 
to differ from state to state.  But an examination of such rights in the central Himalayan 
region in Northern India can explain the type of rights enjoyed by the villagers in the 
past, the reasons for and the consequences of the disappearance of such rights. 
 
Property Rights and Forests in the Central Himalayan Region 
Before the onset of commercial forestry in the early twentieth century to meet the 
demands for railway sleepers and the manufacture of turpentine and resin from chir 
tree, the forests were used and managed by the peasantry.  Conservation was achieved 
by customary limitations on users rather than formal management.  However in many 
oak forests, rules prohibited lopping of leaves in the hot weather and the grass cut by 
each family was strictly regulated.  The penalty for the infringement of these rules 
included boycott and or exclusion of the offender from the forest. 
However, in accordance with the Indian Forest Act of 1878 which empowered the 
British government to reserve for the state's use all forests not on privately owned land, 
the government refused to recognise traditional notions of community ownership.  
Restrictions were imposed on the villagers' use of forests to ensure regeneration of 
felled trees.  Villagers were allotted specific quantities of timber, the number of cattle to 
be grazed were limited and restrictions were placed on lopping trees for fodder and 
fuelwood.  The annual practice of burning of the forest floor was banned.  Loss of 
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villagers' customary rights to use forests led to massive popular protests and a huge fire 
in the commercially valuable chir forests in 1921.  In response to these protests, the 
government relaxed the restrictions on villagers' access to civil forests.  However, in the 
early 1960s these forests were converted to class I reserved forests and brought under 
the control of the Forestry Department.  The national government reintroduced 
restrictions on these forests again.  But with the disempowerment of traditional authority 
which began in the early 1920s, the villagers' interest in preserving the forest began to 
decline and forests began to deteriorate. 
Since the class II reserved forests were almost exclusively used by the state for 
large scale commercial exploitation, the hill people's user rights were severely curtailed 
and their rights of control were lost.  These in turn reduced significantly the villagers' 
incentive to regenerate and conserve forests.  The loss of control furthermore, by raising 
the possibility in the hill people's mind that the forest resources might be appropriated by 
others, led to a situation where villagers in violation of the rules exploited the forests for 
personal gains. 
In the next category, there are Panchayat forests which mainly consist of oak 
trees and have been maintained quite well probably because the Panchayat which 
regulates the use of forests is formed by the villagers by electing representatives from 
amongst themselves with the permission of the Deputy Commissioner. 
Even in such forests, lopping of leaves for food in the off-season by women in 
violation of the rules or theft by women of other villages occurs quite frequently. 
Somanathan (1991) observes that the Panchayat's administrative style under 
which decisions regarding the regulation of lopping are taken in closed door meetings by 
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male Panchayat members although women feed livestock and do most other agricultural 
and domestic works is probably in part responsible for them. 
On the one hand, although the state took control of the forest land, forest 
resources were exploited by politicians and bureaucrats in collusion with businessmen 
for private gains, and on the other hand, the disappearance of community control and 
restrictions on the user rights of villagers reduced the incentive and ability of them to 
use forest sustainability in the central Himalayan plains. 
Community control was based on the force of social customs and norms which 
enabled community agreement to be reached on the use of forest resources whereas 
the fear of social boycott ensured that no one violated it. 
A different situation has involved experiment with social forestry in West Bengal 
which was one of the first states in India to introduce social forestry.  This is often 
undertaken on degraded lands.  It has been found that in West Bengal with social 
forestry, which involves communal management of the forest, productivity or income 
levels, increase in the villages adopting this and bio-diversity rises. 
The social forestry programme in India has three main objectives - (i) to protect 
the environment; (ii) to satisfy the rising demand for raw materials such as fuelwood and 
industrial raw material; and (iii) to raise the level of income, particularly of rural people.  
The programme has however been criticised on several grounds (Burgess 1992).  It has 
been argued by referring to the Karnataka Government Statistics that in South India, the 
programme has made increasing use of farmland for growing eucalyptus which in turn 
has meant less land is available for the poor.  This in turn means declining output, 
increasing price and rising malnutrition (Shiva and Bandopahayay 1985).  However this 
argument has been strongly refuted with statistical figures by Shyam Sundar (1984).  
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The Forestry Department also rejects the view that farmers were forced to plant 
eucalyptus and says that a large variety of species were made available to farmers at 
no cost (Karnataka Forestry Department 1988).  However while such criticisms have 
been made against current social forestry programme in South India, it has also been 
noted that the area of land used for growing eucalyptus under the programme is very 
small compared with those used for other agricultural purposes (Shyam Sundar 1984).  
Furthermore, one cannot dispute the fact that when better lands are used for food crops 
under green revolution technology, inferior lands should be used for social forestry 
which by taking pressure off existing forests, produces beneficial effects on the 
environment.  Nadkarni (1989) argues that handing over the power of forest 
management to the local people would not necessarily solve all the problems and that 
even when they had free access to the forest, the poor had hardly shown any more 
concern for the environment than had private commercial interests. 
Support from Nadkarni's argument can, to some extent, be found in Russia.  It 
has been claimed that with the demise of the USSR under the weakened power of the 
central government of the Russian Federation, the conservation in local areas has 
suffered.  Under the communist regime, the USSR maintained by force a system of 
pristine forested areas on a large scale and local people were not even allowed to use 
them for excursion.  These were protected by force.  Now the central government does 
not have sufficient finances to afford enforcements.  Local people are therefore, 
encroaching on these protected areas and in some cases cattle grazing is occurring on 
them.  Because of political changes, pre-existing methods of governance in Russia are 
disintegrating.  Thus it would seem that in some cases, decentralisation will favour 
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environmental conservation for sustainable development; in other cases it will not.  It is 
dangerous to generalise. 
Traditional rights do not always promote environmental preservation and 
sustainable development. 
A case in point is in the tribal areas of Northeast India.  In this region, population 
growth has been very rapid and income aspirations are rising (Tisdell, 1995).  The 
traditional form of agriculture in the tribal areas of this region is slash-and-burn and 
property rights to use land have been devised by tribal groups to support this type of 
agriculture.  This system of rights is very difficult to change. 
Given the socio-economic dynamics of the region, intensification and 
extensification of slash-and-burn agriculture has occurred.  As a result, land degradation 
has accelerated, yields from slash-and-burn (jhum) agriculture are declining and 
considerable biodiversity loss has occurred (Ramakrishan, 1992, 1995).  The length of 
the jhum cycle has now shortened in some cases to 4-5 years and a greater land area is 
under cultivation and exposed to the elements at any one time.  This has accelerated 
biodiversity loss because the composition of available habitats for species has changed 
and botanical species requiring other than a few years to re-establish themselves are 
unable to survive. 
As Ramakrishnan (1992) points out jhum cycles of 25-30 years are relatively 
economic as well as in relative harmony with nature.  When jhum cycles are reduced to 
4-5 years, the yield to effort ratio of this type of agriculture becomes very low and this 
form of agriculture is relatively uneconomic and unsustainable.  The need exists to find a 
settled form of agriculture which is more sustainable, economic and environmentally 
acceptable. 
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Although settled forms of conservation agriculture have been developed e.g. 
alley-cropping with hedgerows, transition to this type of agriculture is difficult 
(impossible) given traditional land rights.  In Mizoram for example, the Mizos allocate 
fallowed land to be brought into cultivation by the village to the villagers by ballot.  
Individuals have no right to particular pieces of land in perpetuity for all villagers have a 
right to the balloted land.  Private rights in the cultivation of a piece of land only exist for 
a family as long as the area where it is located is under cultivation by the village.  
It has proven very difficult for the Government of Mizoram to modify the system 
so as to encourage forms of settled agriculture.  The Government of Mizoram has 
through its New Land Use Policy (NLUP) attempted to alienate some land from the tribal 
system for use by individuals in settled agriculture (Lianzela, 1994, 1995).  Success has 
been limited, but greatest in the neighbourhood of Aizawl, the capital of Mizoram.  
However, it should be noted that settled agriculture in this region needs to be of 
conservation-type rather than conventional if it is to be sustainable.  The situation is 
different as far as allocation of jhum lands in Arunachal Pradesh is concerned but land 
rights are still problematic and an impediment to the introduction of settled agriculture 
(Roy and Kuri, 1995). 
If sustainable development is to be achieved in Northeast India, institutional 
changes and variations in legal practice in relation to land rights will be necessary.  This 
amounts in effect to a change in governance.  At the same time, scientific and technical 
research should be accelerated to develop improved methods of settled agriculture for 
the region.  It should be noted that not all interest groups in Northeast India want a 
change in land rights.  Some are able to exploit the current situation it seems to their 
own advantage (Roy and Kuri, 1995). 
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The Interventionist State and Corruption 
Corruption increases the cost of and reduces the benefits from development 
programmes to the society.  As a result, the gap between the potential and realised 
achievements continues to widen thereby further undermining the country's chances of 
achieving sustainable development.  Corruption grows in an institutional environment 
which fosters directly underproductive activities.  Since political parties, bureaucracy, 
law enforcement agency and judiciary are all vital components of the state apparatus, it 
is important to comment on the theoretical perspective of the role of the state in 
economic development since the 1950s. 
The Keynesian revolution by casting doubts on the ability of the free market to 
achieve optimal results gave a strong boost to economic planning and the interventionist 
role of the activist state (Shapiro and Taylor 1992).  Keynes' emphasis on domestic 
economic prosperity as opposed to international concern was extended to support 
national industrialisation strategies in less developed economies.  Support for such 
strategies also came from the writings of Singer (1950) and Prebisch (1959) which 
argued that due to the differences in price and income elasticities between LDCs and 
developed countries, raw material exports of LDCs could not pay for their manufactured 
imports.  Their arguments were extensively used by LDCs to justify the application of 
Import Substituting Industrialisation (IS) strategy in development. 
However, persistent attacks against state intervention in the market in the form of 
quantitative restrictions, licenses etc. came from Bauer (1972, 1984), Buchanan (1980), 
Bhagwati (1982), Lal (1983), Bardhan (1984) and from many others as well. 
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Bauer, learning from his experience of Indian development, argued that 
government failures which manifest themselves in corruption, mismanagement etc. are 
more important than market failure, and that market imperfections are caused and not 
cured by government interventions.  Hence the state should not interfere with the 
market mechanism which has the capacity to self-correct.  Buchanan specifically raised 
the issue of economic loss resulting from profit seeking activities of the privileged groups 
in the presence of the state.  Bhagwati consistently argued that under state intervention 
and a Quantitative Restriction (QR) regime, competition for rents which accrue to the 
winners of government largesse turns into widespread directly unproductive profit-
seeking (DUP) activities such as lobbying, active politics, bribe paying etc. with the 
result that normal market activity may be replaced by activities seeking government 
favours.  Deepak Lal agrees with Bauer that in an interventionist state the bureaucratic 
failure may be worse than market failure.  Bardhan extends Lal's argument to the Indian 
case where he finds that the conflicts between bureaucrats and industrialists over 
appropriation of rents interact with India's traditional rural-urban disparities to perpetuate 
stagnation.  North (1981) suggests that institutional inefficiency creates within the state, 
political and economic efficiency which transform the state into a vested interest group.  
For Lal, one of the most ardent neoclassicals of the 1980s, if the free market system 
cannot operate then the activist state ought to be prevented from being controlled by 
special interest groups, if necessary, even by a ruthless and undemocratic government. 
 This has the indirect implication that democracy which can foster the growth of vested 
interest groups is not compatible with growth. 
The following two important points seem to emerge from these discussions: 
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(1) corruption seems to grow within rent seeking activities which thrive under inward 
oriented development which relies on state intervention and market restriction.  
Therefore under outward oriented development, market restriction is removed, 
state intervention disappears along with rent seeking activities and corruption. 
(2) The other point is that a ruthless autocratic government will be able to destroy 
the special interest groups, open up the economy for outward oriented 
development and eliminate rent seeking activities and corruption. 
But neither of these points would be applicable to all the developing economies.  
For example, to substantiate the first point the reference of East Asian economies is 
drawn.  But in South Korea, state intervention and market restrictions did not completely 
disappear with the implementation of outward oriented development programmes.  
Despite corruption and rent seeking during Import Substituting Industrialization (IS) 
period in both South Korea and Taiwan, the state intervention significantly improved the 
state and performance of these economies and made them highly competitive. 
On the other hand, the corruption which existed in the Indian economy during the 
IS period for 34 years from 1956 to 1990 seem to have grown on a massive scale after 
the opening up of the Indian economy.  Therefore, corruption and inefficiency are not 
always entirely due to rent seeking under a QR regime. 
Secondly, a ruthless authoritarian state also consists of individuals who 
implement the state apparatus to achieve the state's development goals.  These 
individuals can easily become corrupt, become their own vested interest group, creating 
a trade-off between economic efficiency and state power as well as extracting rents 
from the private sector which neoclassical political economy failed to recognise (Shapiro 
1988). 
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One important reason as to why the development economists in the 1950s and 
1960s failed to recognise these problems seems to be that they accepted the traditional 
neoclassical separation of the economic and political spheres (Shapiro and Taylor 
1992).  In the modern state, the traditional separation between economic, political and 
even judicial spheres seem to be disappearing.  Where this happens, the state can 
assume the character of a predatory state where the ruler or the government more or 
less systematically employs its position to extract money or resources from its citizens, 
without providing very much in return.  A purely predatory state does not have any 
interest in economic policy other than fostering its own welfare by systematically 
devoting itself to creating and capturing rents of various kinds with the aid of 
government machinery (Lundahl 1996). 
Corruption can be found in almost every polity in many forms.  In many African 
countries, it is virtually impossible to get a government job without paying for it, even if 
the persons are from the same tribe or clan as those who are in charge of appointment 
and dismissal (Lundahl 1996).  In a predatory state, since corruption originates at the 
top i.e. President or Prime Minister and other ministers, the magnitude of corruption 
continues to grow to eventually encompass all bureaucrats and agents of most state 
apparatus. 
Law enforcement agents such as customs and police officials need to be bribed 
to discharge even their normal duties.  Courts pass verdicts in favour of those who pay 
most.  For the school children to pass their examinations, the teachers would have to be 
bribed.  The personnel at state hospitals cater to those who pay them directly.  Private 
sector enterprises factor bribes into their production costs.  The presence of a corrupt 
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public sector is in itself an indirect invitation to the private sector to try to secure a 
proportion of rents being generated by government action (Lundahl 1996). 
At every stage of economic activity there seems to exist a principal-agent 
problem which encourages managers to pursue their own objectives of increasing their 
benefits even though this reduces the profits of the owners.  If the cost of benefits is 
entirely borne by the owner then the manager has an incentive to increase these 
benefits substantially.  In a predatory state the problem spreads upward in an ascending 
order from the lowest public official to the head of the state for whom the owner is the 
society at large. 
Thus the existence of such a state produces effects which are extremely negative 
from the viewpoint of sustainable development. 
 
Law Enforcement and Bureaucrats 
People are more likely to commit crime if the likelihood of being caught is low and 
if a bribe is always the easiest way to eliminate the possibility of being caught.  In a 
corrupt system, the damage to the victims of crime will tend to increase as the laws are 
enforced more leniently because people will be encouraged to engage in criminal 
activities.  In other words, as the chance of getting caught decreases, more people will 
be willing to take the chance with the result that the criminal activity and the damage to 
the crime victims will increase which, in effect, will increase the cost from crime to the 
society. 
When committing crime becomes a norm in a society, it becomes a part of rent 
seeking activity.  There are instances of cases where assets of private individuals have 
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been transferred to the ruler by threats or use of violence or by court decision (Millet 
1977). 
Inefficient and corrupt law enforcement machinery cannot enforce contractual 
obligations, uphold and protect property rights and as a result, fail to keep the 
transaction cost of all economic activities at all levels to the minimum.  North (1981) 
argues that the specification of property rights is the most essential requisite for 
economic performance, subject to technological change.  Referring to the famous 
Coase Theorem (1937) he observes that clearly defined property rights and zero 
transaction costs will provide correct incentives to individuals.  Such incentives under 
free trade will lead to efficient allocation of resources among individuals.  However, this 
cannot happen without an efficient and honest law enforcement machinery.  North also 
admits that changes in the institutional factors and in the theory of the state (which was 
mentioned earlier in this paper), account for the presence and persistence of inefficient 
property rights. 
Bureaucracy and law enforcement agency are interlinked.  Bureaucrats cannot 
properly implement any government policy if the law enforcement agents are corrupt.  
Corrupt bureaucracy provides a strong incentive to law enforcement officers to be 
corrupt as well.  A bureaucrat will have a strong tendency to be corrupt if expected 
income from corrupt practice is significantly higher than the normal salary and perks.  
Such income should also be high enough to more than offset the cost of likely detection 
(bribes, job loss etc.). 
However in a predatory or semi-predatory state, where the government's only 
interest is to preserve and further its own vested interest rather than to formulate and 
apply correct economic policies, the bureaucrats at all levels will be corrupt as public 
 
 18 
offices are used for granting/selling favours at all levels of the state.  In such a situation, 
the likelihood of the corruption of a bureaucrat being detected is smaller and the costs of 
avoiding detection and punishment are also smaller.  When these happen, the gap 
between the expected income from corrupt behaviour and the normal salary of a 
bureaucrat also can be smaller for a bureaucrat to be induced to adopt corrupt practice. 
 Such would be the situation in many third world countries where the size of the 
bureaucracy is very large. 
However, in recent years some bureaucracies in some countries are embracing 
institutional change in the process of implementation of development programmes 
through participatory approaches under which the state bureaucracy joins hands with 
NGOs which give local people more control over research and development processes 
(Farrington and Bebbington 1984, 1993; Thrupp, Cabarle and Zazueta 1994).  Due to 
the widely perceived view that since most state agencies are centralised, authoritarian, 
formalistic, inefficient bureaucracies and are unable to accept and adopt the imaginative 
change (Thompson 1995; Mouzelis 1994; Wunseh and Olowu 1990; Korten 1988), it is 
felt that the state bureaucracy, by joining hands with NGOs and local people in the 
participatory approach, can implement development programmes which are sustainable. 
However, experiments in such participatory approaches to development have 
been confined to a few rural projects in a few countries.  Large scale application of such 
an approach to most development programmes can achieve good results provided, of 
course, we assume that all institutional preconditions such as the state is 
developmental, not predatory, the bureaucracy is honest and efficient, law enforcement 
agents are honest and efficient, the representative rural people who are involved in 
participatory approaches (as the entire village cannot be involved) have no 
 
 19 
special/vested interest different from that of the rural community at large and the 
community at large, bureaucracy and law enforcement agents are not politicised.  These 
are essential components of the institutional framework without which good governance 
and sustainable development may continue to remain an elusive goal.  Unfortunately we 
cannot make such assumptions for most of the developing economies. 
 
 
Indian Situation:  Some Comments 
The Indian state cannot be classified as either a predatory or developmental 
state.  In a predatory state, Lundahl (1996) argues the government action serves to 
keep the technology stagnant, to hold back the accumulation of physical and human 
capital, to prevent efficient allocation and use of resources and to distort the income 
distribution severely by creating a strong concentration in favour of the members of the 
ruling clique.  In India's case, while income distribution may have favoured the wider 
body of members and supporters of the ruling clique, on other counts, the effects of 
state action may not have been so negative.  On the other hand, although the promotion 
of general welfare and improvement in the standard of living of people have always 
been among its objectives, it cannot still be called a developmental state as it has, since 
the late 1980s, been paralysed by the action of vested interests which have led to the 
phenomenal growth of corruption and systematic incapacitation of all institutions 
fundamental to good governance in a developmental state. 
Politics dominates daily life as political parties vie with one another for power and 
plunder of the public purse.  High taxes and a complex system of comprehensive 
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controls have produced one of the world's largest and most thriving underground 
economies accounting for around 50 percent of economic activity.  Rao's economic 
reform programs appear to have failed to effect the necessary radical institutional 
reforms.  Only reforms which have been politically easy and not threatened the special 
interests created by the comprehensive control regime have been implemented.  The 
rents continue to accrue to the most powerful interest groups - politicians, bureaucrats, 
union leaders and members, public sector employees, selected business groups and 
farmers.  All private property rights are still not guaranteed or protected from 
government encroachment (Kamath 1993).  On the state of institutions and corruption, 
The Statesman Weekly (1996) notes that not in the last thirty years since Indira Gandhi 
set about institutionalising corruption, abusing power, emasculating the bureaucracy and 
subverting the judiciary, have governments been willing to accept the fundamental 
postulate of the rule of law.  As for the government of Narashimha Rao, it further adds 
that it has seen brazen attempts to protect corrupt ministers.  There has been 
interference with the due process of law to protect the family/individuals, and the list is 
endless.  There has been subversion of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to 
deny investigation of the First Information Report (FIR) in the Bofors case and to refuse 
to question the Hindiya brothers, Win Chadha and Ottavio Quattrochi despite the 
knowledge that each of them received money from Bofors into their accounts.  The CBI 
Chief Secretary confessed to the Supreme Court in Hawala matter that political 
interference prevented the Bureau from doing their duty.  In the last five years, the other 
corruptions such as the securities scam, the two sugar scams, the telecom scandal, the 
cover-up in the Hawala case etc. also became intrinsic components of the government 
(The Statesman Weekly 1996).  While during Indira and Rajib Gandhi's Prime 
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Ministership institutions were systematically destroyed, public interest was confused 
with survival and the distinction between public property and domestic petty cash 
became blurred, Rao's defence of outrageous corruption and abuse of power and the 
substitution of one family by another in the process, suggests that everything was being 
subordinated to tactics not principles, the interests of power not the demands of 
governance and to the belief founded on an amoral base that everything was fair in 
politics and power (The Statesman Weekly 1996).  Apart from these, corruption was 
also present in significant measure at the provincial and local administration levels.  For 
example, it is common knowledge that in India a thriving parallel (unofficial) market 
exists in education.  Appointments to the position of teachers at schools, students' 
places in engineering and medical colleges can be purchased and students wishing to 
do well in their examination and obtain better results need to be customers in this 
parallel market for education. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Despite the neoclassical economists' unflinching faith in the capacity of the free 
market to cure all economic ills of developing countries, free market policies in the 
absence of good governance do not seem to achieve much success. 
Neoclassicists seems to implicitly believe that free market policies will create the 
appropriate institutions.  But if the state systematically destroys the institutions who will 
force the state to restore the institutions to their rightful status?  Neoclassicals perhaps 
would suggest that people would regulate the behaviour of the state.  But when the 
state assumes the predatory status, what will happen then?  Neoclassicals do not seem 
to find any appropriate answer other than to say that the neoclassical theory had not 
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conceived of a modern theory of state which incorporated all three powers - political, 
economic and legal, within the state.  Although there are corruptions in South Korea and 
Taiwan, governance in those countries is far superior to that in India.  The institutional 
forces in these two countries were significantly influenced by their intellectual and 
geographical proximity to Japan which strengthened Confucian cultural values of these 
societies. 
On the other hand, India is not in the geographical and intellectual proximity of 
such a culture as the Japanese.  It is surrounded by countries most of which were parts 
of an undivided Indian sub-continent.  Therefore it is in proximity with parts of its own 
culture.  The Indonesian economy, before the mid-1980s, was performing as badly as 
the Indian economy.  But its geographical presence in the most dynamic region of the 
world economy and its geographical proximity to Singapore would have produced 
lasting beneficial impacts on its institutions which in recent years has helped it to 
implement policies.  Thus good economic policies will not achieve sustainable 
development if they are not implemented properly.  But effective implementation of 
policies depends on good governance.  Thus, it can be argued that good governance is 
just as important as and even more important than good economic policies.  However, 
good governance is crucially dependent on the presence of appropriate institutions.  
Therefore sound economic policies must be supported by appropriate institutions or 
effective institutional changes for sustainable growth and development.  This analysis 
also has shown that in some cases, good governance can be achieved by decentralised 
and participatory approaches but in other cases by centralised governance structure.  
Hence there is no universal governance structure which is applicable to all situations. 
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